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Abstract
Recent literature on optimal nonlinear taxation has shown that in
models with a single level of government public provision of private
goods can help redistribution by mitigating self-selection constraints.
The aim of the present paper is to extend the analysis to a …scal fed-
eralism setting with two levels of government. To accomplish this goal
we start by explicitly modelling the informational asymmetry that in
our framework motivates decentralization in the …rst place: the lower
level is able to observe the local costs of production, which vary across
localities, but the central level does not. Then, using an extended ver-
sion of the optimal income taxation model with two ability types, we
show that even though it is the lower level that is responsible for the
public provision of private goods, in-kind transfers can still help the
federal level to redistribute between high- and low skilled individuals.
Finally, we characterize the optimal marginal tax rates, which take a
di¤erent form from that of a unitary model, and the optimal matching
grants. The latter, in particular, have a very di¤erent structure than
the one derived in previous …scal federalism studies.
We also …nd that it is vital to model informational asymmetries
between the central and the local level explicitly. Models where the
informational asymmetry is not explicit might have very little to say
about decentralization in economies where the local level has an infor-
mational advantage over the central level.
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day care; …scal federalism.
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Public expenditures are large in all developed countries. In many European
countries they are close to 50% of GNP. These expenditures occur both at
the federal and the local level. As a rough characterization one can say that
federal level expenses are in the form of cash transfers whereas local level ex-
penditures take the form of locally publicly provided goods and services. In
Sweden, as an example, in year 2001 local level expenditures, almost exclu-
sively in the form of publicly provided goods and services, amounted to 28%
of GNP. Given the large quantitative magnitude of both federal and local
level expenditures it is of great importance to understand how the federal
and local levels interact, the principles that should govern the responsibility
for diﬀerent types of expenditures and the structure of intergovernmental
grants. Since long there exists a large literature studying these issues.
In order to understand the interplay between the federal and lower levels
we need a stylized model. However, it is essential that the model corresponds
to the real world. In our view many previous models use a misleading styl-
ization of the economy. Hence, we will begin this paper by brieﬂyd e s c r i b i n g
what we believe are the essential facts about the actual ﬁscal federalism
structure.
1. There is income heterogeneity among individuals. The high taxes
and large public expenditures that we observe in all developed countries
can only be understood if we believe redistribution between heterogeneous
individuals is an important goal.
2. There is heterogeneity among local communities in at least three im-
portant respects: costs of production and preferences vary across commu-
nities; the income distribution varies across communities; the demographic
composition varies across communities.
3. To achieve redistribution the federal level uses nonlinear income tax-
ation, not a proportional tax.
4. Local communities have an informational advantage in terms of local
preferences and production conditions.
5. Local communities provide mainly private goods, not public goods.
Previous studies have not taken these stylized facts into account in a
satisfactory way. The generic ﬁscal federalism model is a model with a
representative agent in each local community; both the federal level and the
local level use a proportional income tax and the local level is responsible for
provision of a local public good. Asymmetric information is rarely explicitly
modelled. In our view, this type of model does not capture the important
aspects of real economies.
If we want to study whether a certain good should be provided by the
local or the federal level and how a grant system should be designed we be-
lieve it is essential to understand, in the ﬁrst place, why the good is publicly
provided. What function does public provision serve? In almost all previous
1theoretical ﬁscal federalism studies one has assumed that the local commu-
nities provide a local public good. The reason for public provision is then
taken for granted and not explicitly modelled. Hundred years ago it was
maybe the case that public goods constituted the major part of local public
expenditures. Nowadays, however, local public expenditures are only to a
very small part of the public goods type. The lions part are private goods
with rivalness in consumption, like education, health care, care of elderly
and day care. There exist several explanations for why public provision of
certain types of private goods can be beneﬁcial. All these explanations are
provided in models with just one level in the public sector. In this paper
we focus on the reason pointed out in papers by among others Boadway
and Marchand (1995), Blomquist and Christiansen (1995) and Cremer and
Gahvari (1997). The motivation for public provision in those papers is that
public provision of a certain type of private goods helps to mitigate the self-
selection constraint in a model where redistribution is an important goal.
Day care is probably the good in question that best ﬁts the explanation
provided in those papers. Hence we will in this paper use a model where
day care is publicly provided, the reason being that this helps redistribu-
tion. Since we believe redistribution, not public good provision, is the most
important reason for the type of tax/transfer systems we observe in the
developed countries, we assume the federal level wants to achieve income
redistribution via a nonlinear income tax.
The decision making in the local communities is of crucial importance
for the workings of the model, the form of vertical ﬁscal externality and the
d e s i g no ft h eg r a n ts y s t e m .T h es t y l i z a t i o nu s e di nm a n yp r e v i o u sm o d e l s
with a representative agent in each community and each jurisdiction deciding
on how much of a local public good to provide gives a simple structure, but
is not a valid stylization of the local decision making. It is a fact that in
each community there is heterogeneity in the population, which makes it
plausible to consider a more complex decision making where also the local
authority is interested in redistribution.
It is widely recognized that an informational advantage is one impor-
tant reason for decentralizing some decisions to the local level. However,
this informational advantage is rarely modelled explicitly. In this paper we
explicitly model the informational advantage that might motivate decentral-
ization. We assume that the costs of production vary across communities.
Local politicians know the local production function, but the federal level
does not. The production costs for, say, day care might vary across localities
because of the presence of radon in the ground in some places, presence of
air pollution requiring extra cleaning costs, etc.1
1We assume that the cost conditions in all other respects are equal across communities.
It is, of course, true that the cost of living can vary between regions and that this might
have implications for how taxes and grants should be designed. Such diﬀerences in living
costs would be observable and would give rise to other issues than those that we study
2The instrument set available at the local level is also vital. As will be
shown, letting the local level have access to a linear tax can seriously hamper
the federal level in pursuing its goals. We will therefore assume the local
level can only use a proportional tax. The local level will also be responsible
for the provision of day care and a local public good. Since the local level
can not make cash transfers, the local policy maker has to use provision of
day care and the local public good to aﬀect the utility distribution in the
community.
The paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, it contributes
to the ﬁscal federalism literature in the sense that we investigate if stan-
dard results “survive” when we consider a setting that corresponds better
to reality, namely that there is provision of a private good that can help mit-
igate a self-selection constraint. Second, it contributes to the literature on
publicly provided goods. Earlier analyses of how public provision of private
goods can help to soften the self-selection constraints in an optimal taxation
problem have all been performed in unitary models. Here we investigate how
results are aﬀected in a setting where the incentive-compatibility constraints
thwarts the redistributive attempts of the central level but the provision of
the good that weakens these constraints is done at the local level.
The ﬁscal federalism literature is vast and contains sub-literatures fo-
cusing on diﬀerent aspects of how the federal and local levels can be in-
terconnected. For example, risk sharing and horizontal competition due to
mobility of some economic factor/agent constitute two important topics.2 To
simplify, we do not deal at all with these issues in this paper. The literature
more related to the present study is concerned with vertical interconnec-
tions arising from some commonality of tax base between diﬀerent level of
government.3 In Boadway and Keen (1996) the analysis is concerned solely
with eﬃciency issues (they abstract from diﬀerences in ﬁscal capacity across
states and also assume all individuals to be identical) and the emphasis is
on the optimal ﬁscal gap (the mismatch between expenditure and revenue-
raising responsibilities) in a federation. They ﬁnd that the optimal federal
government policy involves a negative tax rate and that this can imply in
reasonable circumstances a negative ﬁscal gap. In Dahlby (1996) the focus is
on state commodity taxes and tax bases that are interrelated across states.
In each state the decisions are made by a representative agent. The federal
level can use an income tax and a set of grants. Dahlby characterizes the set
of optimal grants and shows that the unitary solution can be implemented
by a suitable set of grants. Dahlby and Wilson (2003) examine vertical ﬁs-
cal externalities in a model where state governments provide a productivity
in this paper, namely that the local level has better information on local production
conditions than the one the federal level has access to.
2See e.g. Lockwood (1999), Cornes and Silva (2000), Aronsson and Wikström (2003),
and Wellish (2000).
3See Keen (1998) for a general discussion of the topic.
3enhancing public input and the states and the central government share the
tax base for both a labor income tax and a proﬁts tax. All states are identical
and local public policies are in each state made by a representative agent.
Dahlby and Wilson (2003) ﬁnd that matching grants are needed to correct
for the vertical externality.4 The matching grant should reﬂect the marginal
tax revenue that accrues to the federal level when the public expenditure
increases by one unit. The unitary nation solution can be implemented by
a suitable set of grants.
Boadway et al. (1998) consider a federation where both the federal and
local levels have access to a linear income tax and the local levels provide a
local public good. All states are alike. An interesting feature is that in each
state there is a population with heterogeneous skills and that both the state
and the federal policy makers have a redistributive motive; they both pursue
policies in order to maximize utility for the worst oﬀ individual (the Rawlsian
criterion). The federal level can also use lump-sum transfers/taxes to the
local level. As in most earlier papers there are no informational asymmetries.
They ﬁnd that the unitary nation solution can be decentralized. In this
decentralized solution the local level pursues all redistributive taxation and
transfers income to the federal level.
Our model has strong similarities with Boadway et al. (1998), Dahlby
(1996) and Dahlby and Wilson (2003), but there are also important diﬀer-
ences. In our model the local level provides day care. In a model with a
federal proportional income tax this would have generated a tax base eﬀect,
as in Blomquist and Bergstrom (1996). This externality could be corrected
by a matching grant of the form described in Dahlby and Wilson (2003).
However, since we assume that the federal level uses an optimal nonlinear
income tax, the important eﬀect from the day care provision is no longer the
tax base eﬀect but the eﬀect on the self-selection constraints. We believe our
formulation of the federal level tax system is more realistic and also in line
with how optimal income tax systems are modelled in unitary economies.
Another important diﬀerence is that we explicitly model the asymmetry of
information between the federal and local level. In our model the costs to
produce day care diﬀer across communities. If the federal level can observe
these costs the unitary nation solution can also be implemented as a de-
centralized solution. However, if the federal level can not observe the day
care costs, but local communities can, then there exists no unitary solution
(involving public provision) and the decentralized optimal solution diﬀers
from the solution obtained under the assumption that the federal level has
full information.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief outline of our
model. In section 3 we analyze the unitary solution with observability of
4A very interesting contribution of Dahlby and Wilson (2003) is that they show that
the ﬁscal vertical externality can be negative.
4costs. Section 4 describes the decentralized solution for the cases with and
without observability at the federal level of local costs. For the latter case
we characterize the federal income tax and the optimal grant system for
supporting the local communities. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
The model builds on the two-types version of the optimal income taxation
model developed by Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982). There is a federal level
of government and two local communities. The two local communities have
an identical number of citizens. To simplify, mobility of households is ruled
out.5 In each local community the population is made up by low skilled and
high skilled agents. Both local communities have the same proportion of
high- and low skilled individuals.6 Moreover, we assume for simplicity that
in each local community the number of low skilled workers is equal to the
number of high skilled workers and we normalize it to one.
Agents of type 1 are assumed to be the low skilled ones: they earn a
unitary wage w1.A g e n t so ft y p e2 are assumed to be the high skilled ones:
they earn a unitary wage w2 >w 1. The two local communities diﬀer with
respect to the producer price of providing day care. Local community h
is characterized by a high cost parameter ph, whereas local community l is
characterized by a low cost parameter pl <p h.
Households supply labor in the market and gross income is taxed non-
linearly by the federal authority. The disposable income net of expenditures
on purchases of day care services is used to ﬁnance consumption of the sin-
gle consumption good produced in this economy. This consumption good is
also used as numeraire. Following Blomquist and Christiansen (2003) the
demand for day care services is modelled in a very simple way: day care
services demanded are always equal to labor supplied.7 Day care can be
publicly provided and households can top up public provision with private
purchases. Households have (identical) preferences represented by the con-
cave utility function U = u(c,L)+v(G),w h e r ec is the consumption good,
L is labor supply and G a local public good. The federal level maximizes a
social welfare function given by a weighted sum of the utilities achieved by
5As long as mobility is not perfect the qualitative conclusions of our anlaysis would
not change if some degree of costly mobility were introduced.
6This assumption does not aﬀect the qualitative results of the model. See Aronsson
and Blomquist (2004) for a model of optimal redistributive taxation in a ﬁscal federal-
ism setting where the distribution of ability types in the population diﬀe r sa c r o s sl o c a l
communities.
7Even if some parents maybe would leave the children in day care when they go to the
dentist or go shopping we believe that parents enjoy being with their kids and that it is a
reasonable stylization to let the demand for day care hours be equal to the hours of work.
To let the demand be a positive monotone function of hours of work would not change
the content of the analysis but create a slightly more complex notation.
5low- and high skilled agents in the two local communities. As regards the
local policy makers, we assume that each one of them chooses the value of
its policy instruments so as to maximize a weighted sum of the utilities of
both low- and high skill living in its own jurisdiction, using the same weights
as the federal level.8
We start by considering the centralized solution where the federal level
does not observe ability types but knows in which local community the
cost parameter takes the value pl a n di nw h i c hi tt a k e st h ev a l u eph.W e
then consider two decentralized solutions where the local communities can
impose a proportional tax on their residents and are responsible for the
public provision of day care and local public goods. We ﬁrst analyze the
case where the federal level knows “which local community is which” and
look at how the federal level can use a matching grant policy to implement
the unitary solution previously derived. Then, we analyze the same problem
for the case where the federal level cannot observe which is the low cost and
which is the high cost community.
3 Unitary solution with observability of costs
We model the local public good as additively separable in the utility func-
tion. This will imply that in the unitary solution with observability of costs,
the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to the other policy instruments will
n o tb ea ﬀected by the level of public good provision. In this section we
therefore do not include the public good in the problem formulation. It will
play a role in the decentralized solution.
Letting T(Y ) denote the federal nonlinear income tax and x the maxi-
mum amount of day care that is publicly provided free of charge to anyone
who demands it, the maximization problem for an individual will take the
form: Max u(c,Y/w) s.t. c = Y −T(Y )−pmax(0,Y/w−x). Substituting
the budget constraint into the utility function we obtain:
Max u(Y − T(Y ) − pmax{0,Y/w− x),Y/w})
Suppressing the dependence on w in the second argument and denoting
by MRScY the individual’s marginal rate of substitution between gross in-
come and consumption (MRScY = − ∂u
∂Y /∂u
∂c), we obtain from the ﬁrst order
condition of the individual’s maximization problem that, for an agent that
is not supplementing the publicly provided day care ration, the marginal
income tax rate T0(Y ) is implicitly given by:
T0(Y )=1− MRScY , (1)
8This does not aﬀect much the ﬁnal results but allows using the envelope theorem to
ag r e a t e re x t e n t .
6whereas for an agent that is supplementing it is:
T0(Y )=1− MRScY − p/w. (2)
Since we assume no mobility the federal level can, if costs are observable,
impose community speciﬁct a x e s .W el e tY k
i and Bk
i , k =1 ,2 ; i = l,h ,d e -
note the before tax income and after tax incomes for type k in community
i. The federal level government’s problem is to choose type and commu-
nity speciﬁc taxes and also the optimal provision level of day care in each
community to maximize a weighted sum of agents’ utilities subject to a
budget constraint and a set of incentive-compatibility constraints. These
are needed to make sure that agents truthfully reveal their type and do not
mimic, namely do not choose a bundle that is intended by the federal gov-
ernment for another group of agents. Assuming redistribution goes from the
high- to the low skilled group, the federal government has only to take into
account that high skilled agents do not mimic. As regards the day care, it
is easy to show that the optimal level of the public provision is not uniquely
determined and that in particular all values above the one demanded by the
low skilled agents are equivalent (see Blomquist and Christiansen, 2003).9
To obtain a unique determination we impose the assumption that the ration
is set at the lowest of all equivalent amounts. The public provision of day
care, xi, in community i,w i l lt h e nb ee q u a lt oY 1
i /w1.W ew i l l a l s o m a k e
the simplifying assumption that at the optimum in each local community
the high skilled agents supply a larger amount of labor than the low skilled



















































































































9Since Blomquist and Christiansen (2003) show how public provision of day care can
mitigate self-selection problems and yield a strict pareto improvement we do not show this




















where Lagrange multipliers are within parentheses, the λi-constraints (i =
l,h) are the self-selection constraints and the γ-constraint represents the gov-
ernment budget constraint. Denoting by a “hat” a variable when referred to
a mimicker and writing u1
i, u2











































− γ =0 (3)
Y 1

























− γ =0 (5)
Y 2













+ γ =0 . (6)
For the high skill individuals we obtain from eqs. (5) and (6) that 1 −
MRS2
cY − pi/w2 =0 . By assumption the high skill individuals supplement.
Hence, from eq. (2) we obtain that the high skill individuals in both localities
face a zero marginal tax.
For a low skill individual, manipulating the ﬁrst order conditions (3), (4)
and (5), we obtain
1 − MRS1
cY = λ∗(MRS1
cY − d MRScY )+pi/w1,
where λ∗ =( λ/γ)(∂ˆ ui/∂c).
By construction the low skill individuals do not supplement and the
expression for their marginal tax is given by (1). Hence the marginal tax




cY − d MRScY )+pi/w1. (7)
8If the public provision of day care is so welfare enhancing that the self-
selection constraint is not binding at the solution to the federal govern-
ment’s problem then the low skilled agents will face marginal taxes equal
to: T0(Y 1
i )=pi/w1. If the low skilled agents live in a local community where
the self-selection constraint is still binding at the optimum with public pro-
vision of day care, then they will face a positive marginal tax rate equal to
a self-selection term plus the term reﬂecting the real cost of providing day
care per extra unit of income earned.
These results are similar to, but slightly diﬀerent from, the results ob-
tained in Blomquist and Christiansen (2003). The reason why the low skill
persons face positive marginal tax rates is that they should face the real cost
of day care. The reason why the high skill should not face this cost via the
marginal tax is that in our model they top up and pay by themselves for
the marginal hours of day care.
4 Decentralized solution
We now assume that the local communities are responsible for the provision
of day care and local public goods. For this to make sense the local level
must have a reason and incentives for providing day care. In our view
local politicians, as those active at the federal level, have an ambition to
redistribute. However, we also know that usually local level authorities are
not allowed to perform income distribution by use of cash transfers. Our
model provides a rationale for this. If local politicians were allowed to use
cash transfers they would not provide day care. However, not being allowed
to use cash transfers, they will use public provision of day care in order to
achieve their redistributional goals.
As we already anticipated, we will assume that the local policy maker’s
objective is to maximize a weighted sum of the utilities for the high- and
low skill groups and that the weights used are the same as those used by the
policy maker at the federal level (see footnote 8).
Public provision of a local public good is assumed partly for realism and
partly for analytical convenience. It allows us to build a model where in
equilibrium there aren’t any surpluses in the budgets of the local jurisdic-
tions. However, in the following we will not focus on the issue of local supply
of public goods when presenting the results.
4.1 Decentralization with observability of local costs
In a setting where local communities have the power to impose a (positive)
proportional tax on the income of their residents, if the federal level can
observe which local community has a low producer price of day care and
which has instead a high producer price, there is a straightforward way to
implement the unitary solution obtained in the previous Section. Remember
9that the optimal level of the public provision was not uniquely determined
and that all values above the one demanded by the low skilled agents were
equivalent. This means that an equivalent optimal solution could be found
with the ration set at the level of day care demanded by the agents with the
largest labor supply (by assumption the high skilled individuals). Then, to
implement the unitary solution in a decentralized setting, it is suﬃcient to
tell the local communities that all their expenditures on public provision of
day care will be refunded by the federal government. In a framework without
local public goods provision, if the federal government chooses a matching
grant at a 100% rate, the local communities are not constrained in their
budget decisions. This however does not mean that the local public expen-
diture will be inﬁnite, since, as we set up the model, the households do not
demand day care in excess of their labor supply. Thus, each local community
will provide agents with as much day care as they demand without imposing
any additional tax on them; in particular in the i-th local community the







assumption). If the local community is also responsible for the provision of
a local public good this must (partly) be ﬁnanced by a proportional local
income tax. However, the federal level can adapt its income tax schedule so
that the net eﬀect for the individuals of the federal and local level taxes are
the same as in the unitary solution. The level of the public good provision
could be controlled by community speciﬁcg r a n t s . T h e s eg r a n t sc a nb eo f
the matching grant type, but lump-sum grants would also work. Hence, if
costs are observable the unitary solution can be decentralized.
4.2 Decentralization without observability of local costs
The really interesting case is, of course, that where the information set of
the federal level is inferior to that available at the local level. Hence in
this subsection we consider the case where the federal level can observe
neither the per unit cost of producing day care nor the total day care costs
in a community. However, we assume that the hours of day care publicly
provided in a community can be observed and that the grant system can use
this information. Thus, the federal government observes the level of local
public provision but it does not observe the per unit cost of day care. It
only knows that half of the local communities are characterized by ph and
half are characterized by pl. Now the federal government must take into
account the possibility that mimicking occurs also between agents living in
diﬀerent communities since it cannot provide each local community with its
own (community speciﬁc) nonlinear tax schedule. There is only one federal
income tax schedule applicable to everyone. This schedule must be designed
in such a way that people self-select properly.
The federal government chooses a nonlinear income tax schedule T (Y )
and each local community chooses its proportional tax rate ti together with
10the level of the ration xi and the level of the local public good Gi.T h ec o s t
of the local public goods is uniform across communities and normalized to
one. This value is known to the federal government. There will also be a
grant system from the federal to the local level. Below we will both study
the case of a linear grant and that of a nonlinear grant.
4.2.1 Individuals’ behavior
An individual pays both federal and local income tax. Income left after the
payment of the federal income tax is denoted by B: B ≡ Y − T (Y ).A n
agent of type k living in local community i chooses optimally labor supply
Lk
i = Y k
















Deﬁning the indicator function Ik
i as:
Ik








from the ﬁrst order condition of problem (8) we get:
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( 9 )a l l o w su st oi m p l i c i t l yd e ﬁne the federal marginal tax rate and the







wk =1− ti − T0 − Ik
i pi/wk =1− θ − Ik
i pi/wk (10)
The optimal Y k









of an agent of type k living in local community i. With respect to V k
i
the following holds: ∂V k
i /∂ti = −Y k
i (∂V k
i /∂Bk






114.2.2 Local governments’ behavior
We will study two types of grant systems; one linear and one nonlinear.
When studying the nonlinear grant system we will linearize the local gov-
ernments budget constraints around their optimum points. Hence, here it is
suﬃcient to describe local governments’ behavior when a linear grant system
is in place.
Under a linear grant system the total grants paid out to a local commu-
nity will be: p∗Di − R where p∗ is a matching grant per unit of day care
provided by the community and R is a lump sum tax (or transfer if it takes
a negative value). The federal government is assumed to be a Stackelberg
leader in the tax setting game. It knows that the local community i chooses





















is the total amount of units of day care publicly
provided free of charge by the local community i.
The solution to this problem will give the local tax rate ti, the provi-
sion Di and the provision Gi as functions of the federal level instruments
Y k
i ,Bk
i ,p ∗ and R. These functions must satisfy the local government’s bud-





















































































4.2.3 The federal government’s optimal policy
The federal government’s optimal policy can be found as the solution to the
problem of maximizing a weighted sum of utilities subject to self -selection
constraints and a budget constraint.
If we think of the agents’ indiﬀerence curves as deﬁned by the indirect
utility function (11), we could have two possible outcomes with respect to
the ranking of the slopes of these curves. For sure, the low skilled living in
community h will have the steepest indiﬀerence curves in this space and the
high skilled living in community l the ﬂattest ones. However, one cannot
tell a priori how the slopes of the indiﬀerence curves of the low skilled living
in community l and of the high skilled living in community h are relatively
ranked. If the diﬀerence in local technologies for day care provision is suﬃ-
ciently large relatively to diﬀerence in unitary wage rates for low- and high
skilled workers, then we will have that the indiﬀerence curves for the high
skilled living in community h are steeper than the indiﬀerence curves for
low skilled living in community l. The opposite case will occur if the eﬀect
of the diﬀerence in marginal productivities for low- and high skilled workers
dominates the eﬀect of diﬀerences in local technologies for day care.10
From the ranking of the slopes of indiﬀerence curves it can be determined
which self-selection constraints should be taken into account in the federal
government’s problem. The possible binding self-selection constraints are
those running downwards and linking pair of adjacent types. Assuming that
the pattern of relevant binding self-selection constraints is such that the high
skilled in l must be induced not to mimic the high skilled in h, that the high
skilled in h must be induced not to mimic the low skilled in l and ﬁnally
that the low skilled in l must be induced not to mimic the low skilled in h,























10However, it cannot in principle be ruled out the case where the indiﬀerence curves for





























































where, using c Y k
i to denote the gross income earned by a mimicker of ability












The pattern of binding self-selection constraints assumed above reﬂects
t h ec a s ew h e r et h ed i ﬀerence in local technologies for day care provision is
suﬃciently small relatively to the diﬀerence between high- and low skilled
productivities in the market. It is interesting to note that in this case all the
binding self-selection constraints involve agents living in diﬀerent local com-
munities. This feature contributes to make public provision of private goods
especially eﬀective, even more than in the standard models with just one
l e v e lo fg o v e r n m e n t .T h er e a s o ni st h a th e r ei tc a ns e r v ef o rt h ef e d e r a lg o v -
ernment as a partial substitute for the impossibility to impose community-
speciﬁc nonlinear income tax schedules. Whereas in the framework where
it was originally considered public provision of private goods had no welfare
eﬀe c ta sl o n ga st h el e v e lo ft h er a t i o nw a si n f r a m a r g i n a lf o ra l la g e n t s( i n -
cluding the mimickers) in the economy since all agents could have access to
i t ,t h i si sn ol o n g e rt r u ei nac o n t e x tw h e r em i m i c k e r sa n dm i m i c k e dl i v ei n
diﬀerent jurisdictions. In fact, in this latter case public provision of private
goods turns out to be welfare-enhancing even when a marginal increase is
evaluated starting from a zero initial level, the reason being that not all
agents can take advantage from its provision.
Linear grant system With a linear grant system and the assumed pat-




















































+2 R ≥ p∗ X
i=l,h
Di, (γ)
where Lagrange multipliers are within parentheses, the λk
i -constraints rep-
resent the self-selection constraints and the γ-constraint is the federal gov-
ernment’s budget constraint.



























































































































































































































l , δY 1
h, δB1
h, δR and δp∗ represent the indi-
rect eﬀects of the federal government’s policy variables via the adjustments
in the values of the decision variables chosen by the local authorities. These
terms are deﬁned in the Appendix.
We are now ready to characterize the optimal distortions imposed at the
margin on the labor/leisure choice of each type of individuals.
Proposition 1 Denoting by MRSk
i the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween earned income and consumption for an agent of type k living in lo-






















































































































































































































11Notice that the deﬁnition of MRS that we are using here is slightly diﬀerent from the
one we have been using in Section 3.
16Proof. See the Appendix.
In Section 3 we found that in the unitary solution with observability of
local costs all the high skilled agents, both those living in local community
l and those living in local community h, faced a zero marginal tax rate.
On the other hand, if the central government cannot observe “which local
community is which”, we would get that in the unitary solution only the
high skilled agents living in local community l should be undistorted at
the margin, the reason being that, when community speciﬁci n c o m et a x
schedules cannot be used, the high skilled living in local community h should
face a non-zero marginal tax rate in order to discourage mimicking from the
high skilled living in local community l. According to (22) we get instead
the result that in the decentralized solution (under the assumption that the
central authority cannot tell “which local community is which”) also the
(total) marginal tax rate faced by the high skilled agents living in local
community l is in general diﬀerent from zero. The term labelled Ψ0 is a
budget term that reﬂects the change in the value of the net transfer of the
federal government to the local communities when the high skilled agents
living in local community l are induced to (work more and) marginally
increase their earned income. It is due to the change in the optimal level
of public provision of day care chosen by the local community l. The term
labelled Ψ00 is instead a welfare term that reﬂects how the well-being of
agents living in local community l is aﬀected as a consequence of the changes
in the optimal values of the variables chosen at the local level (tl, xl and
Gl) when the high skilled living there are induced to marginally increase
their earned income. Reﬂecting the eﬀects on the well-being of agents living
in local community l, it also incorporates the eﬀects on the binding self-
selection constraints involving agents living in local community l as potential
mimickers.
It is immediate to see how from (22) one can easily obtain the optimal
marginal tax rate of the centralized solution, for in this case we would have





















As regards the high skilled living in local community h, the (total)
marginal tax rate provided by (23) is made up of three terms. The ﬁrst
term is a fairly standard self-selection terms that relies on the diﬀerence in
the slopes of the indiﬀerence curves of a mimicker and of the agent being
mimicked at the bundle intended for the latter.12 In this particular case,
this term reﬂects the distortion that has to be imposed on the bundle of-
12Notice however that in this particular case the mimicker and the mimicked are agents
with the same market ability (they both are high skilled). Nevertheless, since they live
in diﬀerent local communities, they are facing diﬀerent local proportional tax rates and
therefore, even if their labor supply is the same, the consumption level they have access
to is diﬀerent.
17fered to the high skilled agents living in local community h in order to deter
mimicking from the high skilled agents living in local community l.A sf o r
the second and third term of (23), they are similar to the ones appearing in
(22) and their interpretation proceeds along the same lines.
Finally, the interpretation of (24) and (25) follows the one provided for
(23).
Before considering the optimal value of p∗ it is necessary to deﬁne in
this context the notion of “compensated” increase in the rate of subsidy.
By this expression we mean a marginal increase in p∗ accompanied by a
reduction in the value of the lump-sum transfer (or increase in the value of
the lump-sum tax) dR such that the value of the Lagrangian of the local
policy makers remains unaﬀected. To denote the eﬀects of such a change in
the federal government’s transfer policy, a “tilde” will be used over the local









































We are now ready to characterize the eﬃcient value of the matching rate
p∗.
Proposition 2 Denoting by Θi the federal government’s net marginal val-















































































18Proof. See the Appendix.
According to (28) the optimal speciﬁc subsidy chosen by the federal gov-
ernment depends on two terms. The term labelled Ω0 highlights an equity-
eﬃciency trade-oﬀ similar in structure to the one that characterizes the
formulas for the optimal marginal tax rate obtained in the literature on
optimal linear income taxation (see e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, pp.
407-408). The equity element is represented by the numerator and the eﬃ-
ciency element by the denominator. The latter is a measure of the distortion
induced by the subsidy and it is deﬁnitely positive. The former, which de-
termines the sign of Ω0,r e ﬂects the way in which the social marginal utility
of a transfer to a local community varies with the total amount of unities
of day care publicly provided by that local community. Intuitively, if such a
covariance is negative (positive), then the value of the optimal p∗ would be
pushed down (up) for equity reasons since it would mostly beneﬁtt h el e s s
(more) deserving local community, namely the one with the smaller (greater)
value of Θ.
The (numerator of) term labelled Ω00 reﬂects instead how the binding
self-selection constraints of the federal government are aﬀected by a com-
pensated marginal increase in the value of p∗. Such a change would indirectly
aﬀect the binding self-selection constraints altering the attractiveness of the
mimicking option for the potential mimickers through adjustments in both
the local proportional tax rates ti and the level of publicly provided day care
xi.13 Since the denominator of Ω00 is positive, Ω00 has the same sign as its
numerator. A positive (negative) numerator would mean that a marginal
compensated increase in the subsidy p∗ has an overall beneﬁcial (detrimen-
tal) eﬀect in terms of alleviating the self-selection problems faced by the
federal government in pursuing its redistributive goals. For this reason, it
would push upwards (downwards) the optimal value of the subsidy p∗.
Nonlinear grant system Now we analyze the case when the federal gov-
ernment uses a nonlinear transfer scheme in its relations with the local com-
munities. Through a nonlinear transfer scheme the federal government has
a better control over the local level of public provision of day care. However,
it has also to take into account an additional self-selection constraint, the
one requiring that the local community with the lower cost of day care pro-
vision does not have incentive to mimic the high cost local community level.
The local community l m i g h ti nf a c tb et e m p t e dt op r o v i d et h es a m et o t a l
amount of day care that is provided by the local community h in order to
receive the same transfer as the one intended only for the local community
h.
13Notice however that the tightiness of the binding self-selection constraints is not di-
rectly aﬀected through variations in the level of local public good provision since it has
been assumed separability between the local public good and other goods in individuals’
preferences.
19Our approach will be to linearize for each local community the transfer
schedule around the equilibrium point. p∗
i and Ri (i = l,h)w i l ld e n o t et h e
virtual transfer parameters for the local community i. The federal govern-


















































































As compared to the previous problem there is now an additional self-
selection constraint (the λ-constraint) reﬂecting that the low cost community
should not mimic the high cost community.
The optimal (total) marginal tax rates faced by diﬀerent agents are still
given by (22), (23), (24) and (25). The only diﬀerence is that now p∗
l replaces
p∗ in (22) and (24), and that p∗
h replaces p∗ in (23) and (25).
With respect to the optimal marginal matching rates faced by diﬀerent
local communities, Proposition 3 provides the main result for the low cost
community.













, the optimal marginal match-





































20Proof. See the Appendix.
According to (29) the only reason to distort the marginal cost of day
care provision faced by the local community l is related to the eﬀects that
the induced changes in the local community’s choice of xl and tl exert on
the (federal government’s) binding self-selection constraints involving agents
living in local community l as potential mimickers. Multiplying both sides














































an equation that can be interpreted in terms of equality at the margin be-
tween costs and gains for the federal government from a compensated in-
crease in p∗
l . In fact, the left hand side provides an evaluation of the dead-
weight loss from departing the actual cost of marginal day care provision
perceived by the local community l from the real resource cost pl.T h er i g h t
hand side measures instead the net marginal beneﬁt (due to the eﬀect on
the binding self-selection constraints λ1
l and λ2
l ) of the induced change in
the values of the policy variables locally chosen.
Finally, Proposition 4 states the main result for the high cost local com-
munity.













, the optimal marginal





















































































Proof. See the Appendix.
According to (30) the optimal marginal matching rate faced by the local
community h is made up of three terms, all related to self-selection problems.
As compared to the formula providing the optimal marginal matching rate
faced by the local community l (eq. (29)), the main diﬀerence is represented
by the ﬁrst two lines of (30). The terms appearing there reﬂect how a com-
pensated marginal increase in p∗
h aﬀects the binding self-selection constraint
21requiring that local communities truthfully reveal their type. They are in-
tended to speciﬁcally characterize the distortion that has to be imposed at
the margin in order to discourage the local community l from mimicking the
local community h. Since the local policy makers choose among alternatives
comparing the welfare of their residents, the mimicking option is made less
attractive when a reform to the system of transfers to local communities
induces changes in the policy variables chosen by the mimicking local com-
munity (in our case db tl, db xl, db Gl) that are welfare-worsening from the local
community viewpoint.14,15
The interpretation of the last line of (30) is instead similar to the one
provided for (29). The only diﬀerence is that in this case it looks at how
the (federal government’s) binding self-selection constraint involving agents
living in local community h as potential mimickers is aﬀected by the changes
in xh and th induced by a compensated marginal increase in p∗
h.






we can rewrite the formula for the optimal marginal match-
ing rate in terms of equality at the margin between marginal costs (left hand
side) and gains (right hand side) for the federal government from a compen-


















































































Notice that both (29) and (30) make clear that in our model the only
scope for a non-zero marginal matching grant for whichever local commu-
nity has to be related to the eﬀects on the binding self-selection constraints
thwarting the federal government in its redistributional attempts.
14The fact that the changes in the policy variables chosen by the mimicking local com-
munity might be regarded as welfare-worsening by the local community itself is of course
a consequence of the fact that a mimicking local community does not have full freedom of
choice over its policy variables. At least some of them are in fact constrained to replicate
the behavior of the mimicked local community.






dRh (and therefore, through the local com-






dRh)a r ea ﬀected by the
assumptions that are made on the possibility for the federal government to observe ti.
In particular, assuming that ti is observable by the federal government restricts further
the freedom of choice of a mimicking local community, for in order to be successful in
masquerading its cost-type it has also to choose the same proportional tax rate chosen by
the mimicked local community.
225 Summary
In this paper we have tried to integrate the literature on vertical ﬁscal exter-
nalities with the literature on publicly provided private goods as a means to
mitigate the self-selection problems in the optimal income taxation model.
We also explicitly modelled the informational asymmetry between local and
federal level that often has been suggested as a motive for decentralization.
As a benchmark we have characterized the unitary solution under the
assumption that the federal level has access to information about the cost
structure in local communities. Under this assumption community speciﬁc
nonlinear income taxes can be used. The results are similar to those given in
Blomquist and Christiansen (2003). The high skill persons’ choice between
leisure and consumption are undistorted and they face a zero marginal in-
come tax. Low skill individuals face a positive marginal income tax which
consists of two parts. There is the usual “mimicking term”, well known
from many previous studies. However, since the low skill persons get day
care for free from the public sector there is also a term reﬂecting the real
cost of providing day care. Under the assumption that the cost structure
is observable the unitary solution can be decentralized in a straightforward
way.
If the costs of producing day care are not known to the federal level, a
decentralized solution must be used. A vertical ﬁscal externality arises from
co-occupancy of a common tax base (labor income) by central and local
governments and the fact that local policy makers disregard the binding
incentive-compatibility constraints that thwart the redistributive eﬀorts of
the central government. We have characterized the total marginal income
tax rates (the sum of the federal and local marginal income taxes) for the
diﬀerent types of individuals. For each type of agent there is still the usual
“mimicking” term, except for the high skilled in the low cost community,
since, given the redistributive objectives of the federal government, no other
agent can be tempted to misrepresent his type by mimicking them. Then
for each agent there are two new types of terms. One reﬂects the increased
subsidy cost for the federal level as an individual earns an income unit more.
The other captures the eﬀects on self selection constraints and individuals’
well being that go through changes in the locally decided policy variables as
an individual is induced to earn one more income unit. Hence, the pattern
of total marginal income taxes in the decentralized solution will diﬀer from
that obtained in the unitary solution with observable costs.
Much of the focus of the paper is on the form of the matching grant.
According to which criteria should the federal grant to the local levels be
designed? We have studied both a linear and a nonlinear grant system. Here
we concentrate on the nonlinear scheme and contrast our formulas with those
obtained in previous studies as, for example, Dahlby and Wilson (2003). In
our model the local level provides a private good – day care. The federal
23level has a strong interest in local public provision of day care since this can
mitigate the self-selection constraints in the federal level’s optimal income
taxation problem. Why would local politicians be interested in local public
provision of day care? Leaving aside the incentives related to the subsidiza-
tion of this kind of expenditure coming from the federal government, in our
model the reason is that local policy makers are interested in redistribution
and that public provision of day care is an instrument for them to pursue
their redistributive goals. This implies that it is essential that the local level
can not perform cash transfers! If the local level politicians had access to
a linear income tax, they would pursue their redistribution via the income
tax, and would not provide day care.
The federal level can inﬂuence the level of the local public provision
by using matching grants. In Dahlby and Wilson (2003), which consider a
productive good that aﬀects the tax base for the federal level, the match-
ing grant should be constructed in such a way that the grant reﬂects the
marginal tax revenue that accrues to the federal level when the local public
expenditures increase by one unit. If in our model the federal level used a
linear income tax we would arrive at a similar result. However, since the
federal level can use a nonlinear income tax it wants to govern the local level
provision so that mimicking is deterred. In the nonlinear grant system the
matching grants are set in such a way that the local communities self-select
to the proper points on the nonlinear schedule. The matching grant for the
low cost community should be set such that on the margin the deadweight
loss from the subsidy exactly balances the marginal gains. These are re-
lated to the eﬀects on the self-selection constraints involving as potential
mimickers agents living in the low cost community. Since the low cost com-
munity must be discouraged from trying to pick the grant intended for the
high cost community, the matching grant for the high cost community has a
slightly more complicated form. The marginal cost of increasing it has the
same form as for the low cost community. The gains are of two diﬀerent
types. On one hand there are gains in terms of slackening the self-selection
constraint that requires the low cost community not to mimic the high cost
community. On the other hand there are gains in terms of slackening the
constraint requiring the high skill person in the high cost community not to
mimic the low skill person in the low cost community. Hence, the gains of
the matching grant are in our model of a totally diﬀerent kind than in the
Dahlby and Wilson (2003) framework.
One of the aims of our study was to see if public provision of private
goods can serve to mitigate self-selection constraints in a model with several
levels in the public sector. We have found, as explained on p. 14, that the
role of public provision of private goods can in fact be even more important
in a ﬁscal federalism setting than in a unitary model.
In common with many earlier ﬁscal federalism studies we ﬁnd that if costs
are observable, then the unitary solution can be decentralized. When costs
24are not observable the unitary solution can not be decentralized; the opti-
mal decentralized solution can not implement the unitary solution. Hence,
it makes an important diﬀerence whether costs are observable or not. This
illustrates that it is vital not only to argue that decentralization is needed
because of an informational advantage at the local level. It is also important
to model the informational asymmetry explicitly. Results on how to decen-
tralize a unitary solution in a model where the informational asymmetry is
not explicit might have very little to say about decentralization where the
local level has more information than the central level.
6A p p e n d i x
The quantities δY 2
l , δB2




l , δY 1
h, δB1



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.1 Proof of Proposition 1































Exploiting the expression for the total marginal tax rate provided by
(10) gives (22).
































































Exploiting the expression for the total marginal tax rate provided by
(10) gives (23).
































































Exploiting the expression for the total marginal tax rate provided by
(10) gives (24).
































































Exploiting the expression for the total marginal tax rate provided by
(10) gives (25).
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Using (26) and (27), and since ∂ti



























































































































































































































































































































f.o.c. (32) can be expressed as:




Since from (20) we have that
X
i=l,h
δRi = −2γ =⇒ E (Θi)=1 , (33)
reduces to
δe p∗ +2 γcov(Di,Θi)=0 . (34)
Substituting in (34) the deﬁnition of δe p∗ and rearranging terms gives
(28).
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The f.o.c. with respect to Rl and p∗
l are:

















































































































































































Multiplying (35) by −Dl and using the deﬁnition of δRl provided by (37)
gives:















































































From (36) and (38) we have:




















































































Finally, combining (39) and (40) and using ∂xl









6.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The f.o.c. with respect to Rh and p∗
h are:






































































































































































































































































































































































































Finally, combining (45) and (46) and using ∂xh





∂p∗ = ∂ e Gh
∂p∗ − Dh
∂Gh
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